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The poor quality of security services offered by providers 
of information and communication technology, or ICT, 
complicates, even stymies, domestic and international ef-
forts to discourage and lawfully respond to criminal activity, 
acts of terrorism and armed aggression in cyberspace. As a 
result, cyberspace has become a parallel universe in which 
the criminal, terrorist and unlawful combatant can operate 
with a high degree of impunity. Adding to the challenge, 
the privacy services provided in the form of user anonymity 
and data encryption make it difficult for law enforcement, 
intelligence organizations and militaries to attribute actions, 
whether lawful or not, to specific individuals or state actors.
An example is the widely reported Stuxnet worm — an 
integrated set of malware tools used to target a particular 
type of industrial control system.1 Stuxnet takes advantage  
of gaping holes in the specification, implementation and  
assurance of security policy. The users of Stuxnet were able 
to exploit these failings to command and control the  
malware anonymously and to do their bidding remotely. 
There are few clues as to who developed or used Stuxnet. 
There is concern that Stuxnet will be used as a template for 
developing similar-purposed malware that will take advan-
tage of other still-to-be-exploited weaknesses in current and 
future ICTs, much like the computer viruses and worms of 
today are variants of those described in Cohen’s dissertation2 
and Morris’ worm.3
However, the accountability 
problem is more than just tech-
nological. There are gray areas 
in international law, such as in 
determining the responsibility 
of a state when nonstate entities 
take action under the direction, 
instigation or control of a state’s 
organs. At present, there are 
conflicting legal opinions about 
the immunity of the state in such 
situations. At one extreme, repre-
sented by the ruling in Nicaragua 
v. United States of America,4 the 
state is immune from account-
ability. Another, more balanced 
interpretation is illustrated in 
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic.5 Where 
does this leave us? Given the 
legal uncertainty in this area, in 
addition to the ease of conduct-
ing covert and clandestine operations in cyberspace, states 
are incentivized to employ others to act on their behalf, for 
example, to incite riots or disrupt critical infrastructures in  
a target state. This lack of legal clarity has two effects: It  
provides cover for aggressors wishing to push the law beyond 
its actual limits, and creates uncertainty for law-abiding  
defenders who may choose to restrain themselves from  
activities that would protect themselves from lawlessness.
Because of the current technical structures — or lack 
thereof — and the current legal frameworks, we expect to see 
more attacks that are difficult if not impossible to attribute 
via technical means.
To be an internationally wrongful act, a state’s action or 
omission must be attributable to the state and constitute a 
breach of an international obligation. Moreover, the state is 
treated as a single entity, so governmental action at any level 
implicates the state as a whole. International law extends 
these criteria to the actions of any group whose actions may 
result in the creation of a new state.
At the international workshop, “Scientific and Legal 
Problems: Creation of the International Information Security 
Systems,”6  we proposed that the international community 
consider taking some specific initial steps that would make 
it more difficult for malefactors operating in cyberspace to 
leverage the gray areas of international law to their benefit. 
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Gen. Keith Alexander, commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency, testifies before 
a Congressional committee on “U.S. Cyber Command: Organizing for Cyberspace Operations” in September 2010.
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Step One: Debunking myths
We must debunk these three commonly held myths.
One of the three burdens of proof used in criminal law 
must be met: beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and compel-
ling, and preponderance of the evidence — These standards 
of proof do not apply to military and intelligence operations. 
In addition, decision-makers rarely have the luxury of such 
certainty of attribution before having to act to thwart or 
respond to attacks, especially in the case of cyberspace, in 
which there is a high level of time and space compression: 
Attacks can unfold in milliseconds, and the physical distance 
between the source of the attack and the target is, for the 
most part, immaterial.
There are some nontechnical methods to determine the 
source of a possible attack — Determining the source of an 
act within the required time to mount an effective response 
is often impossible because of such factors as spoofing iden-
tities and the lack of bilateral or multilateral agreements for 
sharing data about the paths that messages take in crossing 
one or more national borders. Given the way the Internet 
messaging protocols are designed, this is the norm rather 
than the exception. However, such factors are not showstop-
pers in determining culpability. There are many other meth-
odologies that may be used to establish culpability, such as 
those that take advantage of open source, human and signals 
intelligence. The impossibility of reliable trace-back does not 
preclude the use of all other sources and methods to build a 
clear mosaic of responsibility, possibly after the fact.
It is necessary to attribute an act to a state in order to act 
internationally — On the contrary, individuals and groups 
may be investigated and prosecuted under another country’s 
domestic law, if one of five conditions is met, commonly 
referred to as the principles of international jurisdiction:
• Territorial: Action in territory, or “substantial effect” 
in territory
• Nationality (Active): Malefactor is your citizen
• Nationality (Passive): Victim is your citizen
• Protective: Action poses a national security threat to 
your country
• Universal: Crime is so severe that any nation may 
take jurisdiction (e.g., piracy, slavery, genocide)
Step Two: Developing a framework
We recommended that a legal framework be developed for 
assessing the intelligence and military activities conducted 
in physical or cyberspace to reduce the legal uncertainty as-
sociated with such activities. As a starting point for discussion 
and development of such a framework, we proposed creating 
a two-dimensional space, which would map an intelligence 
or military activity to a level of state responsibility based on 
two factors: (1) the degree of state involvement in the activity 
and (2) our certainty of involvement of the state measured, 
for example, by determining whether the state is selecting 
targets, funding the activity, etc.
Step Three:  Providing guidance in applying 
black-letter law
To advance the discussion and formulation of policy on 
conducting intelligence and military activities in cyberspace, 
we recommended that realistic examples of activities in 
cyberspace be given when formulating drafts of black-letter 
rules at the International Law Commission.7 Such examples 
would be of particular value in developing a common lexi-
con and understanding of issues and solutions among the 
legal, policy and technical experts involved in discussions of 
attribution and accountability. At a recent conference in 
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Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center in Virginia 
prepare for a cybersecurity exercise.
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Moscow, it was evident that participants’ interpretations  
of even commonly used terms varied from one country  
to another.
The technical challenge
As international discussions ensue, participants in those 
discussions need to keep in mind that attribution is asym-
metric. Parties to communications can have different goals 
and requirements for attribution, from perfect attribution 
to perfect nonattribution. Attribution involves a negotiation 
among the sender, receiver, and any other parties involved  
in communications and collaborations. In addition, one 
must have confidence that attribution is accurate and  
correct. As described above, this is a matter of degree  
rather than an absolute.
Moreover, attribution will remain a technically chal-
lenging problem — there are no silver bullets or quick 
fixes. For instance, the Internet was conceived without 
a requirement for user accountability. Retrofitting the 
Internet with that requirement has proved elusive. Short 
of starting over, it will require a major shift in the current 
Internet structure.
We also are repeating similar mistakes in our cellular  
communications infrastructures. Many of the current  
cellular infrastructures, for example Global System for  
Mobile Communications (GSM), rely on one-way authentica-
tion between the service subscriber and the service provider, 
by which the subscriber authenticates himself to the base  
station, but not vice versa, leaving GSM-based systems open 
to abuse by malefactors. At the DEF CON 18 exhibition in 
August 2010, a prominent conference on hacking, a partici-
pant with a laptop and antenna demonstrated his ability to 
turn off cellular encryption in the room by issuing a simple 
set of GSM instructions.8
Users of ICT have two options: (1) trust the infrastruc-
ture to deliver the contents of messages correctly or (2) 
have the sender and receiver agree in advance on how to 
judge the integrity of messages without relying on knowl-
edge of the path the message followed from its origin to its 
destination. For option 1, there is little certainty about the 
integrity of messages when they arrive at their destination, 
so attribution is problematic. For option 2, technical issues 
abound, chief among them specifying and correctly imple-
menting the policy and protocols for creation, maintenance 
or even prevention of strong bindings between the sender 
and his or her message, as pointed out by Simmons.9
Stakeholders aren’t limited to the parties exchanging  
messages. Others interested in the outcome of discussions  
on state responsibility may include:
• States and organizations directly associated  
with the sender or receiver
• States and organizations not associated with the  
sender or receiver, but ones that are interested  
in some aspect of the provision, negotiation or  
enforcement of attribution
• States in whose territory messages originate  
or transit en route to their destination
• Providers of communication services such as  
Internet access and network/grid infrastructures
Conclusion
As Thomas Buergenthal and Sean Murphy10 succinctly put 
it: “even the strongest states have long-term and short-term 
political and economic interests in an international order in 
which conflicts are resolved in accordance with generally  
accepted rules, in a manner that is reasonably predictable,  
and that reduces the likelihood of resort to force.”
What is needed are solutions that are holistic in the 
sense that they take into account policy, legal and techni-
cal considerations, while at the same time are practical 
to implement and agreeable to states that are mutually 
distrustful of one another. As the entire history of interna-
tional relations has played out with these forces at work, the 
challenges of integrating cyber law, policy and technology 
are not insurmountable.  o
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